The recent indictment of a former New York State official, Linda Sun (孫雯), for allegedly using her official position to benefit the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has shed light on the vulnerability of US state governments to foreign influence. According to the allegations, chief among Sun’s priorities were derailing New York’s relationship with Taiwan, and furthering China’s propaganda about Taiwan.
Sun’s alleged activities included preventing high-level meetings from taking place between New York and Taiwanese officials (and in some cases replacing them with Chinese-sponsored activities), removing Taiwan from being listed as a country on official travel guidance documentation, removing references to Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC) from Governor Andrew Cuomo’s speeches, and canceling Taiwanese American Heritage Week, among other activities aimed at promoting PRC interests.
The knowledge asymmetry of ethnic politics
That a single mid-ranking official was able to wreak so much havoc in New York’s relationship with Taiwan exposes vulnerabilities stemming from the widespread lack of knowledge within New York’s state government about Taiwan and the US-Taiwan relationship, along with a longtime reliance in New York on ethnic identity politics. Sun allegedly was able to declare herself “in charge of all Asian affairs,” and summarily dismiss requests related to Taiwan, while promoting Chinese interests that enriched herself and her family members.
Organizations aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP, 中國共產黨) United Front Work Department have long dominated Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) “community” groups in New York and across the country. Often working in close coordination with PRC missions in the United States, they work to further Chinese foreign policy goals under the guise of representing ethnic constituencies, and have even exported the CCP’s state repression into American cities. It is important to note that the primary targets and victims of such repression are fellow Asian Americans: including Taiwanese, Hongkongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Chinese dissidents.
The state’s indictment reveals that Sun allegedly exploited her colleagues’ deference to her supposed cultural expertise to seize on all matters relating to Taiwan, even when they did not relate to the Asian American community. In fact, when Taiwan’s representative office in New York realized that Sun was not passing along their invitations, and reached out to other officials in the governor’s office, Sun was still able to steamroll over her colleagues by claiming “Asian” expertise.
The state’s reliance on an all-encompassing “AAPI” community was a key vulnerability – instead of increasing the government’s connections with Asian American constituents, it flattened them, allowing Chinese agents to dominate the perceived identity group. Sun allegedly further made a mockery of Asian American community outreach by appointing her corrupt business cronies to the governor’s “Asian American Advisory Council,” and secretly inviting Chinese officials to join internal government conference calls on policy responses to alleged rising hate crimes against Asian Americans.
Sun’s ability to exploit her role to seize control of New York’s relations with Taiwan were a result of not just her colleagues’ deference to Asian American ethnic politics, but also a lack of knowledge on Taiwan, its current status, US-Taiwan relations, and tensions within the supposed AAPI community. As New York state officials are primary concerned with local affairs, it is not fair to blame them for lacking knowledge that even foreign policy experts fail to grasp, or for trusting their fellow sworn public servants to not be Chinese spies. But we live in times when these concerns have become local, and failing to adapt leaves all Americans vulnerable to China’s ever-increasing efforts within our borders.
There is a clear and straightforward solution to address this problem. Over the past few years, there has been a resurgence of US states opening business and trade offices in Taiwan. In addition to promoting trade and investment between Taiwan and US states, these offices are staffed by state officials and work closely with counterparts across state government, forming a key source of knowledge and exchange with Taiwan. A New York state representation office in Taiwan would have been an alternative source of information and expertise that could have inoculated the state government’s operations against the efforts of a lone, albeit committed, Chinese spy.
US State offices in Taiwan
Once numbering 22 in the early 2000s, the number of US state offices in Taiwan dwindled to six in 2020, as states reoriented towards the Chinese market – in some cases due to Chinese pressure or incentives. As Marshall Reid has previously highlighted for Global Taiwan Brief, 2023 was a “banner year” for Taiwan’s relations with US states, and 2024 has continued apace with several prominent state office openings – including Texas, which Governor Greg Abbott officially opened during a high profile July visit to the country. As of September 2024, 21 states (including the US territory of Guam) have some form of representation in Taiwan, according to the Taipei-based American State Offices Association.
Originally geared to promoting US exports, many of these offices now focus on attracting Taiwanese investment in the United States, along with promoting tourism and facilitating cultural and educational exchanges. Offices are variously administered by a state’s international trade office, economic development corporation, or department of agriculture, depending on the focus and budgetary source of each state.
Regardless of the specific economic focus, the deployed personnel and exchanges incumbent to a permanent office in Taiwan provide the state government with direct sources of information and expertise on Taiwan, bypassing stateside ethnic lobbies and community organizations.
The lack of a New York representative office in Taiwan allowed Sun to allegedly exploit her position within Global NY, the state agency charged with promoting foreign investment, in order to promote corrupt deals with Chinese provincial officials and to marginalize Taiwan. Without alternative internal knowledge or resources on Taiwan, Sun filled the void and colleagues had no grounds to challenge her. Only at the end of December 2023 did New York hire a Taiwan-based consultant as Global NY’s Taiwan Director, and New York still lacks a full office with official representation commensurate with other US states’ official offices.
In fact, New York contracted the same company it uses for its China representation, Tractus Asia, to represent New York in Taiwan. Outsourcing New York’s engagement with Taiwan to a foreign corporation that is primarily concerned with a much larger China practice presents obvious conflicts of interest. Tractus cannot be trusted to provide adequate representation for the state of New York in Taiwan, nor can it be trusted to provide guidance simultaneously on engagement with both China and Taiwan at a time of heightened geopolitical tension that calls for friendshoring and resilient supply chains.
A corporation’s ultimate fiduciary duty is to its shareholders – not the people of New York, nor the people of Taiwan. The only way to ensure New York’s representation in Taiwan is working towards the ultimate benefit of both Americans and Taiwanese is for its staff to be directly employed by the State of New York, not a private corporation with extensive Chinese business interests.
What the United States should do
A major reason for the closure of so many US state offices in Taiwan over the past few decades has been declining state budgets. Shortfalls in funding have presented the main challenge to states opening offices in Taiwan, leading to scrambles to find a department that is able to fund the office (often the Department of Agriculture), a reliance on external consultants, and uncertainty over the longevity and sustainability of Taiwan-based offices.
Recognizing their importance, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 外交部) has subsidized office costs to promote opening new state offices. While these contributions are commendable, the United States is a wealthy nation that should not be dependent on foreign subsidies. Furthermore, as the New York case demonstrates, these offices are of importance to US national security. The federal government should make funding available to every state to open an office in Taiwan, with the goal of representation for all 50 states.
The federal government should also provide clear guidance for state government officials on engagement with Taiwan, and explain clearly that there are no prohibitions against US states from engaging with, or even mentioning, Taiwan. Security briefings and trainings should be expanded to include the role of the CCP’s United Front Work Department in coopting community organizations to advocate for Chinese foreign policy goals. Local officials in state governments should not be left alone in combatting extensive Chinese espionage efforts.
Taiwanese Americans and their advocates should prioritize the opening of state offices in Taiwan, lobbying their state legislatures and raising the issue throughout each state. It is critical that they not rely on offices relating to Asian American or AAPI outreach, which are dominated by pro-China interests. After all, while the Taiwanese American diaspora is critically important, issues relating to Taiwan are not merely an “ethnic concern” rather, they involve one of America’s most important economic partners, and a critical ally for peace in the Indo-Pacific.
What Taiwan should do
Key to the story have been the admirable efforts of Taiwan’s de facto consulates, usually designated as a “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office” (TECO), to engage far and wide across the United States. This is a critical endeavor – addressing decision-makers in Washington is important too, but efforts need to be truly national to reach the American people where they are. In addition to the head mission in Washington, there are 10 TECOs across the continental United States, each overseeing a region of several states.
TECO missions should expand their regional engagement to include robust engagement with each state, ensuring that all 50 states have direct engagement from Taiwan. MOFA should make available additional funds for exchanges, which provide valuable opportunities to educate state officials about Taiwan, and enable them to develop robust connections with Taiwanese counterparts.
The ministry of education should also increase funding opportunities for scholarships such as the Huayu Enrichment Scholarship, which funds US students to study Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan. Nurturing a new generation of promising young Americans from every state through such scholarships and exchanges will provide a wide distribution of Americans who are educated about, and familiar with, Taiwan.
TECOs should be more visible and host more public events throughout the country. Currently, most events are for the Taiwanese diaspora, or else are private functions aimed at elites. While these constituencies are important, more needs to be done to reach every day Americans who are unfamiliar with Taiwan, or whose knowledge of Taiwan is mediated by Chinese propaganda. More visible Taiwanese outreach can also draw stark contrasts with China’s covert and shadowy influence activities.
Taiwan is a staunch US ally, a free and democratic society that is aligned with American values. An open and public strategy of engagement, rather than more discrete subterranean efforts to influence policymakers and elites, will build trust and confidence in Taiwan. Some might view Taiwanese outreach efforts as similar to China’s own efforts to influence the United States, but the comparison misses a key difference: while Chinese influence activities aim to cover up the truth about the Chinese regime and distort key facts, Taiwan merely needs to show people the truth about Taiwan and its thriving democratic and free society.
The main point: Chinese influence efforts have taken advantage of a lack of knowledge about Taiwan within state governments to influence policy. State governments can remediate this vulnerability by establishing representation offices in Taiwan, and the federal government should support such efforts with a goal of establishing 50 state offices in Taiwan. Taiwan should engage in wider and more public outreach across the United States.
