The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region and this center of gravity for global economic growth has become the focal point for strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Governments throughout the Indo-Pacific region are recalibrating how to navigate US foreign policy with the return of president Donald Trump, and the island-nation of Taiwan is no exception. For the Indo-Pacific region, the most transformative event in regional geopolitics over the past decade has been how US foreign policy began under the Obama Administration to “pivot” to Asia in the mid-2010s.
This was followed by the launching of the Trump administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which the Biden Administration then built on and expanded. Coupled with the 47th president’s unpredictable nature, regional actors will naturally wonder what may come with the second Trump Administration. As Taiwan upgrades its New Southbound Policy (NPS, 新南向政策) to “NPS+” under President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) who was inaugurated in May this year – it is worth thinking about how Trump 2.0 may approach its own IPS and Taiwan’s potential role in it.
Past is prologue … perhaps?
While the Obama administration should take credit for initiating the US “pivot” to Asia and noting Taiwan within that framework, the extent of it was limited and Taiwan was still tethered to the US-China relationship. After adopting the late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s Indo-Pacific Concept, the first Trump administration noticeably raised the visibility of Taiwan in the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. The island democracy was mentioned for the first time in official FOIP strategy documents and repeated in official statements by senior Trump Administration officials.
In doing so, Taiwan began to slowly become embedded in a regional strategy- albeit still rhetorically – rather than just within a China context. For example, the 2019 document, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, produced by the State Department under the first Trump administration, prominently featured Taiwan as a component of the US FOIP–mentioning Taiwan 10 times as well as in its National Security Strategy. Set within this context, the United States also hosted the first-ever Pacific Island Dialogue in 2019, notably focusing on a region that encompasses a quarter of Taiwan’s 12 remaining diplomatic partners.
Reflecting the important continuities between the administrations, the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy which was released in 2022 also mentioned Taiwan eight times and Taiwan was also included in its National Security Strategy. After assuming office in 2021, president Biden began building out a “lattice” framework of regional partnerships through the Indo-Pacific that began to institutionalize this regional approach with high-level minilaterals like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), AUKUS, US-Japan-South Korea Trilaterals, and multiple other groupings.
While these partnerships are not directly about–or more pointedly, with Taiwan–these groupings are at the least very related to Taiwan. Of note, at each of these meetings, leaders have expressed public statements of concern regarding the PRC’s destabilizing actions for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The internationalization of security across the Taiwan Strait has been an important key for deterrence.
Trump 2.0: Continuities in FOIP but with a twist
As president Trump prepares to reenter the White House in January 2025, what might we then expect to see from the 47th president of the United States?
First, there will likely be three broad continuities in Trump’s approach toward the Indo-Pacific: (1) a focus on China; (2) burden sharing with allies and partners; and (3) economic security.
Second, whereas the two FOIPs of previous administrations have been very focused on China, and emphasized that allies and partners need to do more for both their own and collective security (with US assistance), FOIP 2.0 will prioritize economic security as the key pillar.
Third, to design and implement this strategy, president Trump is assembling his national security team at lightning speed. A number of the current nominees stick out for their expertise on the Indo-Pacific and understanding of Taiwan’s role in it, showing that the new Trump administration might bring some serious firepower to the region and be able to retain its strategic focus, despite skepticism otherwise.
Trump’s pick for secretary of state, senator Marco Rubio, recognizes the importance of the need for deterrence across the Taiwan Strait and appreciates a holistic approach that takes into account the importance of Taiwan’s international space for enhancing resiliency. The nominee has a long track record of supporting robust US-Taiwan relations and also has the distinction of having been sanctioned by the PRC.
Notably, Rubio has advocated for the United States to include Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) – the regional economic grouping initiated by the Biden administration. In a letter to the Biden administration, then-senator Rubio astutely noted: “It is also critical for US security interests that Taiwan is embedded in the region’s economic architecture. The more economic engagement the United States and allies and partners have with Taiwan, the stronger our collective resilience against coercion.”
While every national security council will have its own unique characteristics in terms of hierarchy and divisions of labor, the selection of Alex Wong as the deputy national security adviser to National Security Adviser nominee Mike Waltz is notable. Wong will be in the same role that Nadia Schadlow and Matt Pottinger filled during the first Trump administration. As such he will likely lead the crafting and implementation of Trump 2.0’s National Security and Indo-Pacific strategies.
Moreover, Alex Wong is a veteran of the first Trump administration and personally handled regional and security affairs for the state department, including the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. At a seminar hosted by GTI on the connectivity between Taiwan’s NSP and the United States’ IPS, Alex Wong stated: “The judgment of whether NSP is working, whether the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy is working is whether we are achieving that balance and neutralizing attempts by Beijing to exert dominance in the region.”
Another relevant pick for the implementation of Trump’s IPS is his pick to be ambassador to the United Nations. Representative Elise Stefanik, president Trump’s pick for ambassador to the United Nations, is a member of the House Taiwan Caucus and also supportive of Taiwan.
Like his picks for security advisor, the position of ambassador to the United Nations will be important when it comes to pushing for Taiwan’s inclusion in the international arena, as it has been done in the past by Kelly Craft and Nikki Haley.
Conclusion
Indeed, multiple factors point toward more continuities than change in the US Indo-Pacific strategy and Taiwan’s role in it under the second Trump administration. Yet, the current geopolitical situation is far more complex than just six years during the first Trump administration – with wars raging in Europe and the Middle East and an emerging “axis of aggressors.” With North Korea’s unexpected entry into the Ukraine War, the European and Asian theatres are becoming increasingly interconnected in complex and dangerous ways.
On the upside, many other countries have also launched their own Indo-Pacific strategies, creating the potential for greater synergies of like-minded allies and partners beyond the region to help balance the scales. As noted by China scholar David Shambaugh: “[T]he [Indo-Pacific] regional balance is dynamic, and the United States needs to remain comprehensively engaged – or else the balance of influence will default to China.”
According to a state department strategic planning document that outlines a four-year strategy articulating US priorities in a given country, the Integrated Country Strategy for the American Institute in Taiwan, states: “Taiwan is one of the most vibrant democracies and economies in the Indo-Pacific region and can help the United States promote democratic institutions, economic standards and norms, and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region.”
While prior US Indo-Pacific strategies have acknowledged the importance of Taiwan’s NSP, it is time for the United States to leverage the NSP more effectively to further its Indo-Pacific strategy. To be clear, NSP is not a defense-focused regional strategy. But, that does not mean the NSP cannot be strategic in multiple ways in the security realm, especially as it bolsters the economic and people-to-people ties that the CCP seeks to weaponize both through economic dependencies and by engaging in other maligned influence activities.
While it may be challenging to directly build relations between Taipei and NSP countries given their concerns about irking Beijing by having high-level contact with Taipei, there are still effective ways to leverage other countries’ Indo-Pacific Strategies in order to pool resources by utilizing the Global Cooperation and Training Framework and other existing platforms.
Trump announced FOIP in 2018 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference – one of the few international fora in which Taiwan can fully participate (without having to adopt the name “Chinese Taipei”). Accordingly, Trump could upgrade US participation in the APEC platform or utilize existing platforms like the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) to convene commerce and security-focused diplomats throughout the region with Taiwan to discuss long-term strategies and technological standards.
More directly, the second Trump administration could also elevate US government participation in the Yushan Forum (玉山論壇) – an international platform held annually to showcase the NSP – by sending a cabinet-level or appropriately senior official to its next meeting scheduled for March 2025. Such a move would show other countries that the United States values Taiwan’s role in its IPS and would encourage other countries to have their own relations with Taiwan. The last US cabinet official to visit Taiwan was US Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar in 2020 during the COVID pandemic.
This will also have the important added benefit of faithfully implementing the TAIPEI Act. More heads of US embassies and officials in the region should talk openly about Taiwan’s NSP and could assist in bringing foreign delegations to Taiwan. On the bilateral front, it can build out from the cooperation with the Development Finance Corporation and USAID, and look for new avenues of cooperation-strengthening through the EPPD, Technology, Trade and Investment Collaboration et al. The role of AIT-Taipei would be instrumental in engaging other like-minded allies and partners.
The international order is in a state of geopolitical flux, but there are historic opportunities as other countries have begun formulating and adopting their own strategy toward the IPS. While China will continue to raise the cost of doing business with Taiwan, it is also up to Taiwan to show why engaging it is a risk worth taking.
Taiwan for its part should fully adhere to the status quo, and assure the international community that it is not forcing the world to recognize its de jure independence–but simply to assert that the free world supports its dignified representation and agency to determine its own future free from PRC coercion and threats. Taipei also needs to adequately resource and articulate its own Indo-Pacific strategy that complements IPS by more holistically taking into account the Pacific Islands in a broader strategic framework.
The fact that Taiwan reopened its Guam office in 2020 is an important first step (Taipei’s 13th office in the United States), but it needs strategic direction and the right personnel (in Honolulu as well) who understand strategy, policy, and the US government and military bureaucracy to effectively connect the two regional strategies together.
While the NSP+ is a promising and necessary step, Taiwan needs its own Indo-Pacific strategy.
The main point: Beginning with president Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, Taiwan has become an important element of the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy. Going into the second Trump administration, the United States could do more to facilitate greater engagement with Taiwan through Taiwan’s inclusion in regional frameworks and international organizations, and by encouraging coordination between US and Taiwan officials. Additionally, while the NSP+ is a promising and necessary step, Taiwan needs its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.
