By Sir Ronald Sanders

In 1796, as George Washington prepared to leave the presidency of the United States, he issued a warning that remains relevant, particularly for Caribbean small states. He was addressing a young republic whose 13 states were still consolidating into a durable Union while facing threats from powerful European nations.

Political parties, he feared, could become dangerous when loyalty to faction displaced loyalty to country, opponents were treated as enemies, and the acquisition of power became more important than its proper purposes.

Washington called this the “spirit of party.” He did not deny that political differences were natural, nor could he have foreseen the indispensable role that organised political parties would come to play in representative democracy. His warning concerned something more corrosive: political competition becoming a permanent struggle in which every contest is treated as existential, every action of an opponent condemned, and national welfare subordinated to partisan victory.

That warning deserves serious consideration in the Caribbean.

Political parties are indispensable to democracy. They organise ideas, contest elections, form governments and provide an opposition capable of holding governments to account. No healthy democracy can function without disagreement, scrutiny and the possibility of peaceful removal of a government through the ballot box.

But unbridled party loyalty becomes destructive when a victorious party treats the state as its possession and opposition parties believe their path to power requires them to attack everything the government does, irrespective of its merit or benefit to the country.

For small Caribbean states, the consequences are especially serious. These countries possess little economic or military power and are highly vulnerable to the demands of larger states. Their trade, finance, investment, tourism, transportation and technology depend heavily on external actors.

They are exposed to coercive measures, arbitrary classifications, financial blacklisting, loss of correspondent banking, visa restrictions, demands concerning taxation and citizenship programmes, and pressure to accept policies devised by larger states for their own purposes. Such demands can materially affect employment, public revenue and living standards, even though the affected countries have little role in shaping them and limited power to resist.

Under these circumstances, national cohesion is an element of national defence.

The political systems inherited by much of the English-speaking Caribbean do not always encourage that cohesion. The Westminster system has served the region well, facilitating regular elections, orderly changes of government and a durable commitment to parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.

But its Caribbean form has a pronounced winner-takes-all character. Electoral victory often gives the governing party effective control of both the executive and the parliamentary majority. This places a special responsibility on governments to exercise restraint, respect independent institutions and recognise that an electoral mandate confers stewardship of the state, not ownership.

Opposition parties carry an equally important responsibility. Their role is not only to scrutinise the government and present credible alternatives, but to do so in a manner that strengthens the state they seek to lead. Opposition for its own sake  – attacking every initiative, obstructing measures that serve the public interest, or denying credit irrespective of merit – does not advance democracy. Exclusion from office by the will of the electorate does not justify conduct that weakens the very institutions an opposition aspires to inherit.

Caribbean states have limited pools of highly trained administrators, economists, engineers, diplomats, educators and technical specialists. Yet too much of this scarce capacity is consumed in political combat. The country pays twice: it loses the contribution of capable citizens and diverts energy that should be directed towards development into a struggle over political advantage.

The damage extends beyond domestic governance. It affects the capacity of Caribbean states to defend their independence, sovereignty and national dignity. External actors recognise when domestic parties are prepared to use international pressure against one another, and when agreements are denounced simply because a government negotiated them.

A powerful country or institution then does not have to confront a united state. It can exploit domestic grievances and allow Caribbean political actors to weaken their own national position.

Caribbean countries need to recover the idea that some interests belong to the nation as a whole. Territorial integrity, constitutional government, electoral legitimacy, economic security, international standing and the dignity of citizens should not become opportunistic instruments of party competition.

Too often, nothing is regarded as being above political exploitation. A foreign government takes a measure harmful to a Caribbean country, and some celebrate because they believe it injures the party in office. An unfounded allegation is made against the country, and political actors repeat it in the hope of embarrassing the government.

But a wound inflicted upon the country to damage one administration does not disappear when another party takes office. The weakened institution, lost international confidence, damaged reputation and adverse precedent become the inheritance of its successor.

Caribbean states cannot afford to approach every external challenge as another opportunity for domestic combat. They require consultation across political lines, professional public services and a national understanding of the principles that should guide foreign and economic policy.

Ultimately, democratic competition must occur within an accepted framework: political opponents are legitimate, constitutional restraints apply to everyone, public institutions belong to the state not political parties, and the defence of national sovereignty is a shared responsibility.

George Washington spoke to a young republic struggling to preserve its independence in a world dominated by powerful states. Caribbean countries face a comparable challenge.

For small states, placing country above party is a practical necessity in navigating an increasingly uncertain international environment. In a world where power is unevenly distributed and external pressures are persistent, domestic division weakens the capacity to respond effectively and coherently. Caribbean nations may not be able to prevent every adverse action taken by larger states, but they can determine whether they confront such challenges with unity of purpose or internal discord.

When the interest of party is allowed to override the national interest, it is not domestic rivals who ultimately prevail, but external forces whose interests are neither aligned with, nor accountable to, the people of the region.

By Chris Knight

Having just joined as the FCA’s new insurance director, it’s been great getting to know the team and see the variety of work they’re doing – whether that’s working with the industry to improve claims experiences for customers, consulting on simplifying our rules or supporting growth with a new regime for captive insurers.

One item that has crossed my desk is vertically integrated business models, which we’re publishing information for firms on today.

When a consumer buys insurance, they need to trust that the firm they’re dealing with is genuinely working toward the best outcome for them – and that they’re not losing out due to conflicts of interest.

This can happen when a single group of companies span multiple parts of the insurance chain: underwriting the policy, distributing it to customers, arranging premium finance, and providing other related services.

It can also happen when firms are connected through ownership or financing relationships that may be publicly disclosed or private in nature. These arrangements can make good and efficient business sense. But they can also create conflicts of interest – particularly if they influence consumer journeys or potentially alter commercial incentives. This has the potential to shape decisions in ways that don’t serve the customer.

This isn’t just a theoretical concern. We’ve taken enforcement action before against firms where conflicts of interest weren’t properly managed, and where ownership or remuneration arrangements influenced customer outcomes.

What firms should do

Having a conflict of interest doesn’t automatically make a business model unacceptable. But you need to take these risks seriously.

You must actively identify, manage and evidence those conflicts. That means effective governance, clear senior management accountability and controls that actually work in practice, not just on paper.

Crucially, disclosure alone is not enough. Simply telling customers about a conflict doesn’t remove your obligation to manage it properly.

You should look at how you design products and panels, how you communicate with customers, how you structure remuneration, and whether your customer-facing information is genuinely transparent about commercial relationships that could affect a customer’s decision.

Wherever a firm happens to be in the chain it needs to assess and be able to evidence the value added in each link.

If you’re considering new ownership, investment or financing structures that could add complexity or create new conflicts, you should factor our expectations into that assessment from the start.

What we’re doing  

We’ve written directly to some firms where we think their business models may be creating heightened risks of conflicts of interest.

But we’re also making our expectations clear to the whole market – because this isn’t an issue isolated to a handful of instances.

We are monitoring developments in this area, so you may receive ad hoc data requests. You should be able to show us how your arrangements deliver good outcomes for customers. Where business models are overly complex or difficult to supervise, we expect you to think seriously about simplifying them. Any material changes to your business model that affect conflicts of interest should be notified to us promptly.

Our position is clear: Where we see firms acting in ways that could harm consumers, obscure accountability or undermine trust, we will act, starting with supervisory engagement, and with enforcement if needed.

Getting this right will help give customers that extra peace of mind that insurance products are working for them.

• Chris Knight, FCA Director of Insurance